In this paper, we propose a crowdsourcing-based framework for myopic target tracking by designing an optimal incentive-compatible mechanism in a wireless sensor network (WSN) containing sensors that are selfish and profit-motivated. In typical WSNs which have limited bandwidth, the fusion center (FC) has to distribute the total number of bits that can be transmitted from the sensors to the FC among the sensors. In the formulation considered here, the FC conducts an auction by soliciting bids from the selfish sensors, which reflect how much they value their energy cost. Furthermore, the rationality and truthfulness of the sensors are guaranteed in our model. The final problem is formulated as a multiple-choice knapsack problem (MCKP), which is solved by the dynamic programming method in pseudo-polynomial time. Simulation results show the effectiveness of our proposed approach in terms of both the tracking performance and lifetime of the sensor network.
Target Tracking via Crowdsourcing:
A Mechanism Design Approach
C ROWDSOURCING is the practice of obtaining needed services, ideas, or content by soliciting contributions from a large group of people, rather than from traditional employees or suppliers [1] . Many of today's sensing applications allow users carrying devices with built-in sensors, such as sensors built in smart phones, and automobiles, to contribute towards an inference task with their sensing measurements, which is exactly an application of crowdsourcing. For instance, today's smart phones are embedded with various sensors, such as camera, microphone, accelerometer, and GPS, which can be used to acquire information regarding a phenomenon of interest. An advantage of such architectures is that they do not need a dedicated sensing infrastructure for different inference tasks, thereby providing cost effectiveness. Another advantage of such architectures is that they allow ubiquitous coverage. Manuscript Systems and applications that rely on utilizing an infrastructure where crowdsourced sensing measurements of participating users are used are poised to revolutionize many sectors of our life. Some example application domains include social networks, environmental monitoring [2] , [3] , green computing [4] , target localization and tracking [5] - [9] , healthcare [10] (such as predicting and tracking disease patterns/outbreaks), and tracking traffic patterns [11] , [12] . For instance, the OpenSense project [2] involves the design of a sensing infrastructure for real-time air quality monitoring using heterogeneous sensors owned by the general public, while [3] involves the design of a similar system to monitor noise levels. GreenGPS [4] uses data from sensors installed in automobiles to map fuel consumption on city streets and construct fuel efficient routes between arbitrary end-points. Various systems to estimate object locations and to track them using smartphone sensors have also been proposed. For instance, work reported in [6] , [8] utilizes built-in sensors in smartphones such as camera, digital compass and GPS, to estimate a target location as well as to monitor the velocity of moving objects. In [5] , [7] , [9] , proximity sensors in built-in smartphones are used to track objects (such as lost/stolen devices) installed with electronic tags (such as Bluetooth or RFID tags). Such systems have important commercial applications (such as tracking lost/stolen objects or accurately estimating arrival time of buses) as well as defense related applications (estimating the enemy's vehicle position prior to an attack).
Existing sensing applications and systems assume voluntary participation of users, for example, [5] - [9] , [11] , [13] . While participating in a sensing task, users consume their own resources such as energy and processing power. Moreover, users may also have concerns regarding their privacy. As a result, existing applications and systems may suffer from insufficient number of participants because it may not be rational for the users to participate. Thus, there is a need to design sensing architectures that can provide appropriate incentives to the users to motivate their participation. Furthermore, users, being selfish in nature, may manipulate protocols of the sensing architectures for their own benefits. Thus, a critical property that any mechanism involving selfish entities should exhibit is strategy-proofness or truthfulness. As has been shown in [14] , mechanisms that are not truthful are prone to market manipulations and can have inefficient outcomes.
Most past work focuses on sensor management problems without addressing selfish concerns of participants [15] - [19] . Information-based measures have been used for sensor management in [15] , [16] which maximize the mutual information between the sensor measurements and target state. Sensor selection strategies that minimize the bound on the estimation error, which is the inverse of Fisher Information [17] , [18] are computationally more efficient than the information-based sensor selection methods [18] . In [19] , the sensor selection problem is formulated as a multi-objective optimization problem, and the Nondominating Sorting Genetic Algorithm-II method is employed to solve the problem. Since selecting a subset of informative sensors out of sensors in the network is an NP-hard combinatorial problem, in [20] , the binary variable sensor selection problem is relaxed and solved using convex optimization.
Transmission of quantized measurements is required in typical WSNs that have limited resources (energy and bandwidth). This gives rise to the more general problem of bit allocation. Given the total bandwidth constraint, the Fusion Center (FC) determines the optimal bandwidth distribution for the channels between the sensors and the FC. In [21] , the myopic bandwidth allocation problem is considered and the algorithms to solve the problem, namely, convex relaxation, A-DP, GBFOS and greedy search, are compared.
Market-based mechanisms for sensor management have started to gain attention only recently [22] - [24] . In [22] , the authors explored the possibility of using economic concepts for sensor management without explicitly formulating a specific problem. The authors in [23] used the concept of Walrasian equilibrium [25] to model market-based sensor management. In [24] , the authors also proposed a Walrasian equilibrium-based dynamic bit allocation scheme for target tracking in energy-constrained wireless sensor networks (WSNs) using quantized data. However, as shown in [26] , Walrasian markets can be unstable and can fail to converge to the equilibrium. Furthermore, computing the equilibrium prices and allocations can be computationally prohibitive. Accordingly, the authors ( [23] and references therein) propose algorithms to compute an approximate equilibrium. Moreover, the mechanisms proposed in [23] , [24] are not truthful and are, therefore, prone to market manipulations.
The main objective of this paper is to design a market-based mechanism [27] to trade information for tracking a target, with the mechanism being computationally efficient, individually rational (to rationalize user participation), incentive-compatible (to ensure strategy-proofness), and profitable (to ensure feasibility). However, as opposed to conventional market scenarios, the problem at hand portrays two unique characteristics-a)] Here, the traded commodity in the market is information. At what prices would information trade, given that the prices users would want to sell their information is dependent on their participatory costs?, and, b) The information acquisition process is in a resource-constrained environment with participants having limited energy, and bandwidth availability for communication. How do we allocate resources efficiently in such a resource-constrained environment? To answer both questions, we propose to use auctions [27] - [29] . One of the chief virtues of auctions is their ability to determine appropriate prices of traded commodities [30] . Further, there is also substantial agreement among economists that auctions are the best way to allocate resources in a resource-constrained environment [31] . Essentially, auctions seek an answer to the basic question 'Who should get the resources and at what prices?'
In our prior work [32] , we limited our focus on the design of an incentive-based mechanism for target localization via sensor selection (which is a special case of the bit allocation problem 1 ). In this paper, we focus on the more general problem of designing an incentive-based mechanism for target tracking while considering dynamic bit allocation. The flowchart of the crowdsourcing-based target tracking mechanism is given in Fig. 1 . Specifically, in this paper, we propose a reverse auction 2 -based mechanism in which an auctioneer (FC) conducts an auction to estimate the target location at each tracking step by soliciting bids from the selfish users (sensors 3 ). The bids of the sensors reflect how much they value their energy costs. Moreover, the sensors' value estimates of their energy costs may also increase as the residual energy depletes, which we also consider in our model. Our auction mechanism is comprised of two components-a) bandwidth allocation function, which determines how to distribute the limited bandwidth (bits) between the sensors and the FC, and, b) pricing function, which determines the payment to be made to each sensor. The focus of this paper is to design these two functions.
To address the participatory concerns of the selfish sensors, we design the mechanism so that it is always in the best interest of the selfish sensors to participate in the auction. Further, our proposed auction mechanism is truthful so that it is not prone to market manipulations. To implement the proposed auction model in a computationally efficient manner, we use dynamic programming by formulating the proposed mechanism as a multiple-choice knapsack problem (MCKP) [33] , [34] . As is shown in the paper, the dynamic programming approach finds the exact equilibrium of our model. Formally, the key contributions of the paper are as follows.
• We propose an incentive-based mechanism to trade information for tracking a target. The proposed mechanism is computationally efficient, individually rational, incentive-compatible (truthful), and profitable. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to propose a market mechanism for tracking a target using selfish sensors that exhibits the aforementioned properties. • We propose a pseudo-polynomial time procedure to implement the proposed auction mechanism using dynamic programming. The dynamic programming approach can provably sustain the market at the exact equilibrium. Our solution is thus stable. • Via extensive simulations, we show the effectiveness of our proposed mechanism, study its characteristics, and also show the benefits of the "energy-awareness" of the mechanism when the participatory costs (value estimates) of the users are dependent on their residual energy. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce the target tracking background. In Section III, we introduce the basic assumptions and formulate the problem. We analyze the incentive-based mechanism in Section IV. The implementation of our proposed mechanism is discussed in Section V as well as the case where the sensors' value estimates are dependent on their residual energy. Simulation results are presented in Section VI, and we conclude our work in Section VII.
II. TARGET TRACKING IN WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS

A. System Model
We consider a WSN consisting of selfish sensors which are uniformly deployed in a square region of interest (ROI) of area . Note that, our work can handle any sensor deployment pattern and the uniform sensor deployment is employed here for ease of presentation. We assume that the target and all the sensors are based on flat ground and have the same height, so that we can formulate the problem with a 2-D model. The target is assumed to emit a signal from location at time step , and the FC estimates the position and velocity of the target based on the sensor measurements. The state vector of the target at time is defined by , where are the target velocities. Table I gives the notations we use in the paper. The target motion dynamics is defined according to the following linear model, (1) where is the zero-mean, Gaussian process noise with covariance matrix where and are defined as, (2), and denote the sampling time interval and the process noise parameter respectively. We assume that the FC has complete knowledge of the process model in (1) .
We consider the isotropic power attenuation model for the target as (3) where is the received signal power at the th sensor at time step , is the emitted signal power from the target, and is the distance between the target and the th sensor at time step , i.e., . At time step , the received signal amplitude at sensor is given by
The measurement noise samples are assumed to be independent across time steps and across sensors and they follow Gaussian distribution with parameters . In order to reduce the cost of communication, the sensor measurements, 's, are quantized into bits before transmission to the FC. The quantized measurement of sensor at time step , , is defined as:
where is the set of quantization thresholds with and and is the number of quantization levels. For simplicity, the quantization thresholds are designed identically at each sensor according to the Fisherinformation-based heuristic quantization as in [35] . Then, given target state at time step , the probability that takes value is (6) where is the complementary distribution of the standard normal distribution. Given , the sensor measurements become conditionally independent, so the likelihood function of can be written as (7) In our work, we consider that the FC reimburses the sensors for energy spent for transmission. By assuming that there are no errors in data transmission, a simple model of energy consumption of sensor at time for transmitting bits over its distance to the FC (the sensors' locations do not change with time) is given as [36] 
where is assumed to be .
B. Fisher Information With Quantized Measurements
Posterior Cramer-Rao Lower Bound (PCRLB) provides the lower bound on estimation error variance for a Bayesian estimator [37] , which is represented as the inverse of the Fisher Information Matrix (FIM), (9) where is the estimate of the target location, and the FIM is a function of the joint probability density function of the sensor measurements and the target location ,
where, the expectation is taken with respect to , and is the second order derivative operator. In (10), the FIM is decomposed into two parts, where, represents the FIM corresponding to the sensor measurements, and represents the FIM corresponding to the a priori information. The FIM corresponding to the sensor measurements, , can be further written as the summation of each sensor's individual FIM [18] , [21] as (11) where represents the standard FIM corresponding to sensor and can be written as (12) where A detailed derivation of can be found in [18] , [21] .
C. Particle Filtering-Based Target Tracking
In this paper, we employ sequential importance resampling (SIR) particle filtering algorithm [38] (which has been employed in many works on the target tracking problem, e.g., [21] , [24] , [39] ) to solve the nonlinear Bayesian filtering problem, where the main idea is to find a discrete representation of the posterior distribution by using a set of particles with associated weights ,
where, denotes the total number of particles. Algorithm 1 provides a summary of SIR particle filtering for the target tracking problem, where denotes the number of time steps over which the target is tracked. Before tracking starts, particles are generated through the prior distribution of the target state with corresponding weights . At each time step , the particles are first propagated through the target motion dynamics. When the bit allocation problem among the sensors is solved with the discrete representation of the posterior distribution (13) , the FC obtains the sensor data vector . According to the likelihood function (6) and (7), the weights of the particles are updated, and the estimate of the target state is obtained. Resampling step avoids the situation that all but one of the importance weights are close to zero [38] . Our problem belongs to the general area of mechanism design [27] . Below we first describe the mechanism design problem in general before formulating our auction in the context of sensor management for tracking.
A. Mechanism Design in Reverse Auction Context
Consider bidders where each bidder competes to sell his object to the auctioneer. Bidder has some private information , which is referred to as his value estimate, about his object. In a direct mechanism, each bidder directly reports his value estimate as (which may not be equal to his true value estimate ) to the auctioneer. Based on the vector of announced value estimates , the mechanism computes an output (which would determine the wining bidder(s)), and a payment (which would determine the payment to be made to each bidder). The utility of bidder is . The following two properties should be exhibited by the mechanism.
1) Incentive-Compatibility: Each bidder's utility is maximized by reporting his true value estimate to the auctioneer. In other words,
2) Individual Rationality:
The utility of a bidder should be non-negative, so that it is rational for him to participate in the game.
B. Our Auction Model
The sensors, in our model, compete to sell the information contained in their measurements to the FC, and comprise the set of bidders (potential sellers) in the sensor network. For each sensor , there is some quantity which is 's value estimate for its unit energy cost, and that is sensor i's true value estimate. Further, we assume that the FC will derive a benefit from performing the location estimation and assume that the FC's value estimate about the unit information of the selected sensors is . 4 The FC is assumed to be unaware of the true value estimates of the sensors so that the sensors have to advertise their value estimates at the beginning of the target tracking process to the FC. This gives the sensors an opportunity to lie about their value estimates hoping for an extra benefit. For instance, a sensor may understate its value estimate in the hope of making the FC buy information with finer quantization (larger number of bits), which countervails its loss for announcing a value estimate that is lower than the truthful one. Or, it may exaggerate its value estimate that might increase the payment made to the sensor sufficiently to compensate for any resulting decrease in the resolution of the information bought.
We assume that the FC's uncertainty about the value estimate of sensor can be described by a continuous probability distribution , where is the lowest possible value which might assign to its data, and is the highest possible value which might assign to its data, and . denotes the cumulative distribution function, where . We let denote the set of all possible combinations of sensors' value estimates: 4 , for instance, can reflect the value estimate of the entity trying to find the lost/stolen object as discussed in [5] , [7] , [9] Also, for any sensor , the set of all the combinations of the other sensors' value estimates is
The value estimates of the sensors are assumed to be statistically independent random variables. Thus, the joint pdf of the vector is (14) We assume that sensor treats other sensors' value estimates in a similar way as the FC does. Thus, both the FC and the sensor consider the joint pdf of the vector of values for all the sensors other than to be
C. Problem Formulation
Based on the above definitions and assumptions, we consider a direct revelation mechanism, where the sensors simultaneously and confidentially announce their value estimates to the FC. The FC then determines the number of bits it should buy from each sensor and how much it should pay them. We assume that the FC and the sensors are risk neutral, so that the expected value of the utility functions, which are defined as the gains minus the incurred costs, are considered in this paper. Our objective is to maximize the FC's expected utility as a function of the bit allocations and the payment vector. We consider the FIM derived in Section II-B as the metric for allocating bits among the sensors. From [39] , [40] , we know that if a matrix optimization problem has an optimal solution, then the matrix optimization problem is equivalent to maximizing the trace of the matrix. Furthermore, by using the trace of the FIM as the metric of tracking performance, the sensors have additively separable utilities.
1) Utility Functions: At time step , we define the expected utility for the FC from the auction mechanism as the total value for its information gain minus the total payment it needs to make (16) where is the payment vector and is the expected payment that the FC makes to sensor . and are both Boolean vectors where represents the bit allocation state of all the sensors and represents the bit allocation state of sensor , i.e., when sensor transmits bits, and if sensor does not transmit its data to the FC in bits. Thus is the number of bits allocated to sensor at time step . Note that both and are functions of the vector of announced value estimates , and we ignore the time index for , for notational simplicity. Since sensor knows that its value estimate is , its expected utility at time is described as the payment it gets from the FC minus its total cost incurred by the energy consumption defined in (8), (17) where . As shown in (8), , where is not a variable, so here we use simplified notation of as . On the other hand, if sensor claimed that was its value estimate when was its true value estimate, its expected utility would be where .
2) The Optimization Problem: Thus, the auction-based bit allocation problem at time step can be explicitly formulated as follows:
Below we describe each constraint in detail.
• Individual Rationality (IR) constraint (18a): We assume that the FC cannot force a sensor to participate in an auction. If it did not participate in the auction, the sensor would not get paid, but also would not have any energy cost, so its utility would be zero. Thus, to guarantee that the sensors will participate in the auction, this condition must be satisfied. • Incentive-Compatibility (IC) constraint (18b): We assume that the FC can not prevent any sensor from lying about its value estimate if the sensor is expected to gain from lying. Thus, to prevent sensors from lying, honest responses must form a Nash equilibrium in the auction game. • Bandwidth Limitation (BL) constraint (18c): The FC can buy no more than bits from all the sensors. • Number of quantization Levels (NQL) constraint (18d):
Each sensor uses only one quantization level. • (18e) is a Boolean variable.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE AUCTION DESIGN PROBLEM
In this section, we analyze the optimization problem proposed in Section III-C. We define (19) at time step for any sensor with value estimate . So denotes the expected amount of energy that sensor would spend for communication with the FC conditioned on the value estimates of the other sensors . Our first result is a simplified characterization of the IC constraint of the feasible auction mechanism.
Lemma 1: The IC constraint holds if and only if the following conditions hold:
Proof: We first show the "only if" part. Without loss of generality, consider that . We first consider the case that sensor claimed that is his value estimate, when is its true value estimate.
So we can get,
Thus, the IC constraint is equivalent to (22) . We now show that (22) implies (20) and (21) . By switching the roles of and , we have (23) Combining (22) and (23), we can see that from which we can derive (20) . Define , these inequalities can be written for any Thus is a decreasing function and it is, therefore, Riemann integrable. We then write the utility function of sensor for all as which gives us (21) . Now we must show the "if" part of Lemma 1, i.e., the conditions in Lemma 1 also imply the IC constraint. Suppose , then (20) and (21) give us:
Similarly, if , So (22) can be derived from (20) and (21) . Thus, the conditions in Lemma 1 also imply the IC constraint. This proves the lemma.
A. Optimal Auction-Based Bit Allocation Mechanism
Based on Lemma 1, problem (18) can be simplified as follows.
Theorem 4.1: The optimal auction of (18) is equivalent to (24) where and the payment to sensor is given by (25) Proof: We may write the FC's objective function (16) as (26) By (20) of Lemma 1, we know that:
Substituting (27) into (26) gives us:
In (28) , appears only in the last term of the objective function. Also, by the IR constraint, we know that for each sensor , . Thus, to maximize (28) subject to the constraints, we must have , Combining this condition with (17) , (19) and (21), we get (29) Combine (29) with the definition of the utility function of sensor , we get the formulation of the payment in (25) . Thus, if the FC pays each sensor according to Equation (25), then the IR constraint is satisfied, as well as the best possible value of the last term in (28) is obtained, which is zero. So we can simplify the objective function of our optimization problem to (27) subject to the three remaining constraints. Thus, Theorem 4.1 follows.
V. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROPOSED MECHANISM
In this section, we consider the algorithm to obtain the solution for the proposed mechanism. We first study the optimal algorithm to solve our optimization problem in (33) , and then the case when sensors' value estimates are dependent on their residual energy.
A. Multiple-Choice Knapsack Problems
The knapsack problem is one of the most important problems in discrete programming [41] , and it has been intensively studied for both its theoretical importance and its applications in industry and financial management. The knapsack problem can be described as: given a set of items with profit and weight and a knapsack with capacity , select a subset of the items so as to maximize the total profit of the knapsack while the total weights does not exceed (30) There are several types of problems in the family of the knapsack problems. The multiple-choice knapsack problem (MCKP) occurs when the set of items is partitioned into classes and the binary choice of taking an item is replaced by the selection of exactly one item out of each class of items [33] . Assume that classes of items are to be packed in a knapsack with capacity . Each item has a profit and weight . The problem is how to choose one item from each class to maximize the total profit of the knapsack while the total weight does not exceed . The binary variables are introduced to represent that item is taken from class , the MCKP is formulated as [33] , [34] : (31) where , and are assumed to be nonnegative integers, with class having size so that the total number of items is . By formulating a recursion form, the MCKP can be solved optimally by the dynamic programming method in pseudo-polynomial time with acceptable computation cost when the number of sensors and the bit constraint are not large.
B. Optimal Solution by Dynamic Programming
Substituting (8) into (24), the objective function becomes: (32) where the last term is not subject to the solutions of the optimization problem. Thus, by denoting , the optimization problem in (24) can be written as: (33) Observe that, given , (33) is a Multiple Choice Knapsack Problem (MCKP), which is an extension of the Knapsack Problem (KP) [33] . We interpret our optimal auction-based bit allocation problem as a MCKP as follows: In the WSN consisting of sensors, information to be transmitted by each sensor has variants (bits) where the -th variant has weight and utility value . As the network can carry only a limited capacity , the objective is to select one variant of each sensor such that the overall utility value is maximized without exceeding the capacity constraint.
The MCKP can be solved by the dynamic programming approach in pseudo polynomial time with operations [33], [41] . Let denote the optimal solution to the MCKP defined on the first sensors with restricted capacity (34) and we assume that if , or , . Initially we set for . We use the following recursion to compute for :
To explain the dynamic programming algorithm, we construct the trellis for stages and states associated with each stage [21] . Fig. 2 gives an example trellis for and , which contains 6 stages and 4 states. For example, and . Thus, the optimal solution is found as . Note that to get the optimal bit allocation, the solution needs to be recorded at each step corresponding to the optimal . On the other hand, the dynamic programming algorithm for our optimization problem is pseudo polynomial and has the complexity [34] . Therefore, the optimality of the problem (33) is guaranteed and the rationality and the truthfulness properties of our incentive-based mechanism are maintained.
The payment to each sensor can be calculated from (25) . The total number of bits assigned to sensor is determined through the optimal solution of (25), . We first check the optimal solution of (24) with the value estimate vector , and get the total number of bits . If , we claim that the payment of sensor is . Otherwise, we apply bisection method to find the thresholds between and , above which the sensors will be assigned different number of bits compared to the original optimal solution of (24) . Note that the FC can pay the sensors cumulatively after the tracking process is finished.
The pseudo-code of the detailed algorithm is presented in Algorithm 2. 
C. Residual Energy-Dependent Value Estimates
So far, we have assumed that the value estimate of the sensors are invariant of the amount of residual energy of the sensors over time. We now relax this assumption and consider that the (true) value estimates of the sensors are dependent on their residual energy. Therefore, the remaining energy of the sensors are included in their utility functions,
where is the remaining energy of sensor at the beginning of time , i.e., , so that including makes the problem more general, and the new objective function of (24) becomes (37) and the corresponding value of in (33) is Referring to Section V-B, we can find that the target tracking problem with residual energy-based value estimate can also be mapped to a MCKP and solved by the dynamic programming method in pseudo-polynomial time. We assume that the FC knows the energy status of all the sensors at each time step, so the FC and the sensors decide how the value estimate of the sensors change with their remaining energy at the beginning of the tracking task.
VI. SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we study the dynamics of our proposed auction-based target tracking mechanism in a sensor network. In the experiments, sensors are deployed uniformly in the ROI with the size 50 m 50 m and the FC is located at , . Note that our model can handle any sensor deployment pattern as long as the sensor locations are known to the FC in advance. The signal power at distance zero is . The target motion follows the white noise acceleration model with . The variance of the measurement noise is selected as . The prior distribution about the state of the target, , is assumed to be Gaussian with the covariance matrix where so that the initial location of the target stays in the ROI with high probability. The pdf of the value estimate of sensor , , is assumed to be uniformly distributed between and with and , and the value estimate of the FC is assumed to be . The performance of the target location estimator is determined in terms of the mean square error (MSE) at each time step over 100 Monte Carlo trials and the number of particles of each Monte Carlo trial is . We first consider the implementation of our optimal auctionbased target tracking procedure as illustrated in Section V-B, where the value estimates of the sensors do not vary with their residual energy. In the target motion model, measurements are assumed to be taken at regular intervals of seconds and we observe the target for 20 time steps. The mean of the prior distribution about the target state is assumed to be . Two different values of , namely 5 and 8, are considered to examine the impact of total number of available bits. In Fig. 3(a) , we show the number of sensors that are selected at each time step. And the corresponding tracking MSE is shown in Fig. 3(c) . We can see that around time steps 4, 9, 14 and 19, the target is relatively close to some sensor, and fewer sensors are activated. When the target is not relatively close to any sensor in the network, during time periods 5-8, 12-13 and 18-19 , the uncertainty about the target is relatively high, which increases the estimation error, so that more sensors are activated. Fig. 3(b) shows the total utility of the FC at each time step. During the first ten time steps, the utility increases because the FC's information about target track increases. As the FC has learned enough information about the target track, the Fisher information tends to saturate at the last ten time steps. Moreover, at time step 4, 9, 14, and 19 , the target is relatively close to fewer sensors compared to the other time steps, so that fewer sensors are selected according to Fig. 3(a) , and the total payment at these time steps is lower accordingly. Therefore, the utility of the FC has a sudden increase at these time steps. In Fig. 3(d) , we also show the utility of the FC when the term due to prior FIM, , is not included in the expression for the utility function given in (16) . Due to the low noise environment and the accumulation of the information, contains more information and the contribution of the data to the utility function as a function of time diminishes. This is evident in Fig. 3(d) in that we observe a decreasing trend of the utility function as a function of time. Moreover, for all the results, we observe that when we have more number of bits (resources) to allocate, the performance in terms of tracking performance and the gains of the FC is better, i.e., results for are better than those for . In Fig. 4 , we study the utility of the FC (Fig. 4(a) ) and the corresponding MSE ( Fig. 4(b) ) when there are different number of sensors in the network. The figures show that as the number of sensors in the WSN increases, the utility of the FC increases, and the corresponding MSE decreases. It is because as the sensor density in the ROI increases, the chances of the FC selecting more informative sensors that require less payment increase at each tracking step. In other words, competition among sensors increases as sensor density increases, thereby making sensors participate with lesser payments. Also, the FC's utility and the MSE saturate when the number of sensors in the ROI is large. This is because, as has been observed in economic theory, a large number of competitors in a market correspond to a scenario of perfect competition and result in the market prices to saturate. Note that when and 16, the utility of the FC decrease and the MSE diverges after a certain time. This is due to the fact that the number of sensors is not sufficient for accurate tracking over the large ROI. Now we consider the case mentioned in Section V-C where the sensors value their remaining energy. In (1), we consider second and the observation length is 40 seconds. The mean of the prior distribution is assumed to be and the other parameters are kept the same. The target moves back and forth between two different points. During the first and the third 10 second intervals, the target moves as described by model (1) in the forward direction. At other times during the second and fourth 10 second intervals, the target moves in the reverse direction with all other parameters fixed. For the function in (36), we take an example where the value estimates of the sensors increase as their remaining energy decreases according to , where is the initial energy of each sensor at the initial time step, and the power controls the increasing speed. In Fig. 5 , we show a) the remaining number of active sensors in the WSN of the FIM-based bit allocation algorithm in [21] , b) our auction-based bit allocation without residual energy consideration, and, c) when residual energy is considered with different exponent . Note that in [21] , the property of the determinant of the FIM brought the suboptimality of the approximate dynamic programming method. Here, to compare with our work, we employ the trace of the FIM as the bit allocation metric to get the optimal solutions using dynamic programming. For FIM-based bit allocation algorithm and our algorithm without residual energy consideration, a specific bandwidth allocation maximizes the FC's utility for a given target location, resulting in the same set of sensors to be repeatedly selected (as the target travels back to pre-visited locations) until the sensors die (sensors are defined to be dead when they run out of their energy). Thus, those sensors die earlier than the others and the number of active sensors decreases rapidly. However, the increase of the value estimate based on residual energy prevents the more informative sensors from being selected repeatedly because they become more expensive if they have already been selected earlier. In other words, on an average, sensors are allocated lesser number of bits as their residual energy decreases. Moreover, the larger the exponent is, the more the sensors value their remaining energy. We define the lifetime of the sensor network as the time step at which the network becomes non-functional (we say that the network is non-functional when a specified percentage of the sensors die [42] ). For example, we assume , in the energy unaware case, the lifetime of the network is around 22. However, by our algorithm, the lifetime of the network gets extended to 30 when , and even gets extended to the last time step when the tracking task ends with or , i.e., the network keeps functional until the last tracking step.
Corresponding to Fig. 5 , in Fig. 6 , we study the tradeoff of considering the function in terms of the utility of the FC (Fig. 6(a) ) and MSE ( Fig. 6(b) ). As shown in Fig. 6(b) , the FIM-based bit allocation algorithm gives the lowest tracking MSE because the sensors with highest Fisher information are always selected by the FC. For our algorithm without energy consideration and with residual energy considered as and , the loss of the estimation error and the utility of FC are very small. However, the loss increases when increases to 15 and 30. This is because when the sensors increase their value estimates more aggressively, they become much more expensive after being selected for a few times. Then the FC, in order to maximize its utility, can only afford to select those cheaper (potentially non-informative) sensors and allocate bits to them. In other words, depending on the characteristics of the energy concerns of the participating sensors, the tradeoff between the estimation performance and the lifetime of the sensor network is automatically achieved.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have designed a mechanism for the dynamic bandwidth allocation problem in the myopic target tracking problem by considering the sensors to be selfish and profit-motivated. To determine the distribution of the limited bandwidth and the pricing function for each sensor, the FC conducts an auction by soliciting bids from the sensors, which reflects how much they value their energy cost. Furthermore, our model guaranteed the rationality and truthfulness of the sensors. We implemented our model by formulating the optimization problem as a MCKP, which is solved by dynamic programming optimally. Also, we studied the fact that the trade-off between the utility of the FC and the lifetime of the sensor network can be achieved when the value estimate of the sensors depend on their residual energy. In the future, we will study the mechanism design approach for the non-myopic target tracking problem.
